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The idea of human rights is central to contemporary liberal politics and international relations. For many, the increasingly global prominence of this concept – which demands a universalistic suspension of any normative deference to nation, culture, and context, and which is at the heart of so many justifications for international economic sanctions and military interventions – represents the crowning achievement of modernity. As Charles Beitz observes, ‘today, if the public discourse of peacetime global society can be said to have a common moral language, it is that of human rights’ (Beitz, 2009: 1). And yet, despite the ubiquity of human rights in political discourse and the significant amount of scholarly analysis devoted to what it means conceptually, there remains no consensus whatsoever about its history. 
The point in time at which the idea of human rights crystallizes into a distinct and recognisable concept is a matter of considerable contestation. This contestation raises questions about which historical figures can plausibly be ascribed theories of human rights. Are, for example, commitments to human rights first identifiable in medieval political thought – when the idea of subjective rights is widely thought to have emerged as a moral concept – or, alternatively, in the articulation of early-modern natural rights theories? Does the concept of human rights instead emerge as a distinct idea in the aftermath of the American and French Revolutions, or even later, in the twentieth century, following the Second World War and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)? Does it make sense to regard Aquinas, Grotius, Locke, or Paine as theorists of human rights, or would such readings be mistaken or anachronistic, and on what basis might we make such assessments? Answering these questions – and determining how to approach them – is vital for the self-understandings of modern political communities. An adequate interpretation of our liberal and cosmopolitan traditions depends absolutely on an adequate understanding of the history of the idea of human rights. 
In this article, I provide a framework for addressing such questions about the history of human rights through critical assessments of dominant approaches. I identify a sharp scholarly disagreement over the emergence of human rights and argue that it can be explained – and, in principle, resolved – through attention to the problematic methodological commitments that underpin rival historical narratives. Due to limitations of space, I focus on two exemplary narratives, each of which, I argue, misconstrues the object of study relevant to a historical understanding of the idea of human rights. Having attended to their deficiencies, I delineate an alternative approach that enables the development of criteria to assess rival claims about the original crystallization of the idea of human rights, and thus determine which past authors can be thought to have advanced accounts of this contested concept. 
I begin with a relatively brief discussion of the ancient roots of human rights claimed by Micheline Ishay. Her narrative is, I suggest, unconvincing, because it understands an intellectual commitment to human rights too broadly, as equivalent to an endorsement of a supra-historical species of ethical universalism. I then consider, in much more detail, the highly influential – but thus far insufficiently interrogated – thesis advanced by Samuel Moyn, for whom the notion of human rights is radically novel, with its sudden emergence locatable in the international politics of the 1970s. Through an extended engagement with Moyn’s argument, I argue that it can plausibly be taken only as a practice-based account of human rights and therefore cannot sustain the dramatic historical conclusion he defends. My critique of Moyn’s thesis serves a constructive purpose: it enables me to outline what a framework for thinking about history of the idea – rather than the practice – of human rights would look like. Drawing on work in the philosophy of history (Bevir, 1999), I suggest that the appropriate object of study for a history of the idea of human rights must be a cluster of normative and conceptual beliefs, one that is both historically specific and philosophically abstract. 

Human Rights as Supra-Historical Concept 
What are the origins of human rights? This question has prompted various answers. Let us begin with the view that the history of human rights stretches right back across time. Such a view obviously carries with it a definite conception of what a human right is, one that would seem to construe it as a supra-historical entity that is visible across cultures, contexts, and time. Prominent historical narratives conceive of the concept of human rights as somehow latent within various, otherwise disparate, intellectual traditions. Micheline Ishay, for example, charts the development of human rights over ‘a cumulative historical process’ that lasts over two thousand years (2004: 2). According to Ishay, the concept of human rights has discernibly ancient roots. For her, these roots are visible in the influence of ancient religious and ethical thought on the content of the UDHR. In support of this claim, she instances the cultural diversity of membership of the Human Rights Commission’s drafting committee – which included Eleanor Roosevelt, Pen-Chung Chang, Charles Malik, and René Cassin – who together appealed to ‘all the world’s great religions and cultures’ for intellectual inspiration (Ishay, 2004: 17). 
Further unpacking what she views as its core influences, Ishay identifies an array of diverse intellectual sources for the UDHR. These include the texts of numerous individuals and traditions, including Plato and Aristotle (2004: 23), Confucius (22), Cicero and Stoicism (25), Judaism (19), the Quran and Islamic thought (27), Hinduism and ancient Indian works (29), as well as Christianity (39).​[2]​ It is here that we find the ‘early ethical contributions to human rights’ (2004: 15). Although there seems to be little that unites these intellectual sources, they nevertheless, for Ishay, ‘all share basic views of a common good’ (2004: 7). While she acknowledges the important differences between these divergent, often completely unrelated intellectual and religious traditions – and concedes that ultimately ‘Western ethics became the major contributor to the development of human rights’ (2004: 60) – Ishay maintains that the embryonic ideas of the UDHR are ultimately ancient in origin. Her over-arching argument is that ‘across the centuries, conflicting political traditions have elaborated different components of human rights’ (Ishay, 2004: 3). 
	The reason that Ishay is able to establish such links between disparate religious and intellectual traditions and the modern idea of human rights lies in the way in which she defines the concept in question. For her, a commitment to human rights is essentially synonymous with the expression of universalistic ethical values (Ishay, 2004: 3, 16). On this understanding, a commitment to human rights is merely a political instantiation of the moral belief that certain fundamental entitlements be ‘shared equally by everyone regardless of sex, race, nationality, and economic background’ (Ishay, 2004: 3). Human rights can, on such a conception, be represented by any commitment to universalism, and therefore their presence can be located across an abundance of texts that indicate an endorsement of that much broader ethical perspective.​[3]​ 
Positing a definitive link between commitments to universalistic ethics in general and the idea of human rights in particular – such that the presence of the latter can be inferred from that of the former – is highly problematic. For one thing, as Ishay acknowledges, several of the traditions she identifies are not consistent in their endorsement of the egalitarianism that she thinks a key part of the human rights project. Thus, for instance, she notes the centrality of hierarchy in Platonic and Confucian thought, as well as the unequal status conferred to women frequently in the key texts of Christianity, Judaism, and Islam (Ishay, 2004: 57-59). Even more troublingly for the connection that Ishay wishes to draw, there is no necessary, generative conceptual (or normative) connection between a philosophical commitment to moral universalism and an endorsement of human rights. Utilitarianism is, after all, one of the most influential universalistic traditions in modern moral philosophy, and yet is also characterised by a basic hostility to the idea of human rights. Although it is conceivable that a commitment to universalism might be invoked to justify human rights – as we find in the preamble to the UDHR – a mere commitment to the former certainly does not imply the latter. Universalism is far too vague a moral ideal to be thought equivalent to human rights: as the traditions invoked by Ishay make plain, it is possible to be committed to certain universalistic tenets, while being opposed to human rights. It could perhaps be the case that Ishay wishes merely to draw our attention to the plethora of constituent conceptual links between these disparate ancient intellectual currents and the UDHR. Even if this is the case, however, her narrative cannot provide an adequate basis for an approach to the history of the idea of human rights, for reasons that will become clearer below.


The Radical Novelty of Human Rights
Any view that the concept of human rights has a historical existence that stretches across two thousand years – and that it is latent in various intellectual traditions with universalistic tenets – is unsustainable, and has been challenged by narratives that posit much more recent origins. Of note is the markedly different, highly influential analysis put forward by Samuel Moyn, which I will now consider in detail. Moyn’s arresting claim is that the emergence of human rights is radically novel. He dismisses Ishay’s narrative as one that typifies the ‘teleology, tunnel vision, and triumphalism’ that plagues contemporary discussions of human rights (Moyn, 2010: 311; see also, Moyn, 2014). Instead of a ‘search for deep roots’ that can be profitably traced back to the ancient world, Moyn presents human rights as a uniquely recent political phenomenon: for him, the concept appears very suddenly in the late twentieth century, having ‘emerged in the 1970s seemingly from nowhere’ (2010: 3). Moyn describes 1977 as ‘the year of human rights’, the moment when the term became a ‘publicly acknowledged buzzword’ and a staple feature of liberal politics, a circumstance heralded by President Jimmy Carter’s inaugural address and the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Amnesty International (2010: 155). In the forty years since, as Moyn points out, human rights – defined by their ‘agenda for improving the world and bringing about a new one in which the dignity of each individual will enjoy secure international protection’ (Moyn, 2010: 1) – have come to acquire an increasingly dominant position within global politics. 
So, rather than having an ancient lineage, human rights should be thought a peculiarly late twentieth century expression of political utopianism. For Moyn, scholars like Ishay have ‘used history to confirm’ the ‘inevitable rise’ of human rights (Moyn, 2010: 5), such that ‘the past is treated as if it were simply the future waiting to happen’ (2010: 11). Moyn is disdainful of the notion that our cherished political ideals must have venerable lineages and stresses instead the radical contingency of our moral and political inheritances. There are two worries that drive his dethroning of the teleological understanding of human rights. First, he is concerned that any vision of the historical ascent of human rights as inevitable distorts the ‘choices’ and ‘accidents’ that enabled it (Moyn, 2010: 5). Second, Moyn’s disquiet pertains to contemporary politics. His suggestion is that implicitly teleological narratives artificially limit the horizons of our political imagination, such that we will fail to consider whether the ‘reasons’ we have for endorsing the human rights project are, in fact, ‘persuasive’ (Moyn, 2010: 12). Any grand, teleological narrative about the march of human rights inevitably ‘distorts the past to suit the present’ (Moyn, 2014: 1).
	The radical novelty thesis advanced by Moyn is not only opposed to Ishay’s teleological narrative, but also departs from another prominent historical view: that the concept of human rights has its original roots in the eighteenth-century, through a secularisation of theological natural rights theories.​[4]​ In defence of the eighteenth-century, ‘revolutionary’ emergence of human rights, Lynn Hunt argues that ‘sometime between 1689 and 1776 rights that had been viewed most often as the rights of a particular people – freeborn English men, for example – were transformed into human rights’ (2007: 22).​[5]​ A nascent commitment to human rights is, according to Hunt, identifiable in revolutionary documents, such as the 1776 American Declaration of Independence, and the 1789 French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen. These documents offer universalistic commitments to inalienable, individual rights that purport to transcend contexts, culture, and time. Hunt’s view of eighteenth century origins – which we can call the ‘continuity thesis’ – is often treated as a commonplace by scholars of human rights. James Griffin, for example, asserts that ‘the notion of human rights that emerged by the end of the Enlightenment – what can reasonably be called the Enlightenment notion – is the notion that we have today. There has been no theoretical development of the idea itself since then’ (Griffin, 2008: 13, emphases added).​[6]​ 
Although the term ‘human rights’ was not commonly invoked in the eighteenth-century (de Bolla, 2013: 49), the ‘rights of man’ became an increasingly popular and influential slogan in political debate, thanks in part to the hugely successful titular 1791 pamphlet written by Thomas Paine (1969). His Rights of Man reprints the French Declaration in full, and lauds the accompanying Revolution – as he had previously the American – as a progressive development towards the recognition of universal rights (see Lamb, 2015). When considering the meaning of late eighteenth-century texts, Hunt reads ‘rights of man’ as a proxy for what we now understand to be human rights (Hunt, 2007: 22-25).​[7]​ For her, notwithstanding the substantively inegalitarian implications of the revolutionary documents in question (subsequently noted by, among others, Karl Marx), and in spite of the apparent hypocrisy of their authors (such as slave-owning Thomas Jefferson), we can nevertheless legitimately understand twentieth century human rights as an institutionally-embedded political instantiation of those rights that were proclaimed ‘self-evident’ in the late eighteenth century (Hunt, 2007: 15). 
A rejection of Hunt’s view that the rights of man and human rights are essentially equivalent is central to the drama of Moyn’s alternative narrative. Moyn argues that the late twentieth century understanding of human rights is entirely different from both the ‘rights of man’ of the late eighteenth century, and from the earlier natural rights theories that characterise early-modern European political thought. His case against Hunt’s continuity thesis rests on the following pivotal claim: that the rights ‘proclaimed in the era of Enlightenment…were so profoundly different in their outcomes…as to constitute another conception altogether’ than that which characterises the human rights of the late twentieth century (2010: 1-2, emphases added). To explain this difference, and to account for its purported profundity, Moyn invokes Hannah Arendt’s trenchant case against the human rights project advanced in The Origins of Totalitarianism. Her argument is that – as the interwar experience of imperilled stateless groups illustrates – the political use of human rights is, at best, useless and, at worst, dangerous. For Arendt, the plight of the stateless shows that an appeal to human rights becomes relevant only under circumstances in which the individual who needs them is already cast outside the bounds of community, when she is rendered a figure whose unrecognised status leaves her in a far worse condition than a slave or a criminal.​[8]​ Her argument is that the universalistic appeal to human rights conflicts with the recognition necessary to sustain the individual within a community: it is, for her, the ‘right to have rights’ that is politically sacred, but is undermined by the utopianism of human rights (Arendt, 1958: 290-302).
	For Arendt, the practical failure of human rights to make good on its universalistic theoretical aspirations is unsurprising given its historical genesis. She points to the intimate connection between on the one hand, the Enlightenment commitment to the inalienable rights of man, and on the other, the emboldened assertion of national sovereignty that accompanied it. There is an evident conceptual ambiguity in the French Declaration, wherein although individual rights are cast as universal properties – entitlements held by all – sovereignty is nevertheless tied to ‘the people’ of France, thus sanctifying a hard political border, with an internal network of rights and obligations for citizens that, by definition, then implies exclusion for non-nationals. For Arendt, ‘the whole question of human rights was…inextricably blended with the question of national emancipation’ (1958: 291, emphasis added) and it is therefore fitting that its ostensibly universalistic political aspirations quickly dissolved in the interwar period into ‘hopeless idealism or fumbling feeble-minded hypocrisy’ (1958: 269), with tragic consequences for the stateless and minority nationals. 

Arendt contra Moyn
Moyn draws on Arendt’s insights to then ground his key claim that the late twentieth century human rights project that remains with us today is ‘profoundly different’ from the rights of man announced in the French Declaration (Moyn, 2010: 1). In a crucial passage, he argues that:
‘Far from being sources of appeal that transcended state and nation, the rights asserted in early modern political revolutions and championed thereafter were central to the construction of state and nation, and led nowhere beyond until very recently….the droits de l’homme that powered early modern revolution and nineteenth century politics need to be rigorously distinguished from the “human rights” coined in the 1940s that have grown so appealing in the last few decades. The one implied a politics of citizenship at home, the other a politics of suffering abroad. If the move from the one to the other involved a revolution in meanings and practices, then it is wrong at the start to present the one as the source of the other’ (2010: 12-13).
Moyn’s claim is that when it comes to his alleged distinction between eighteenth- and twentieth-century conceptions of rights, it was Arendt who ‘saw this most clearly, though she did not spell out the consequences for the history of rights’ (Moyn, 2010: 12). So, the argument underpinning Moyn’s thesis about a late twentieth century inception is that whereas the rights of man of the revolutionary era are bound up with declarations of national sovereignty, human rights are today an inescapably international project, used to justify what would otherwise be violations of such sovereignty, a view he traces to Arendt. 
I wish now to show that Moyn’s argument overreaches and that the dramatic conclusion he offers is ultimately unsustainable. To do this, it is first necessary to focus on the way in which he misreads Arendt’s thesis, and show how he seems to change the nature of her main argument. Once we appreciate where Moyn’s appropriation of Arendt goes astray, we can then attend precisely to his distinction between eighteenth and twentieth century conceptions of human rights, which, I will suggest, we can flatten, because it relies on a dubious understanding of the object of study in question. The first important thing to note is that the significance of Arendt’s observed connection between the universalistic rights of man and national sovereignty is best understood as political and philosophical, rather than historical, as Moyn suggests. According to Moyn, Arendt saw the ‘clear and fundamental difference between earlier rights, all predicated on belonging to a political community, and eventual human rights’ (Moyn, 2010: 12). It is, however, very clear from Arendt’s text that – notwithstanding her historical observation about the ironic connection between declarations of universal rights and national sovereignty – both her philosophical argument and political diagnosis are actually predicated on the essential sameness of the rights of man and human rights.​[9]​ 
This sameness should not be surprising. After all, Arendt’s normative account of her own idea of a ‘right to have rights’ would seem only to have the Burkean philosophical resonance she claims for it, for as long as there is an intimate connection between eighteenth- and twentieth-century understandings of universal rights. When endorsing Burke’s critique of the ‘inalienable rights of man’, she explicitly cites it as an attack on human rights (Arendt, 1958: 299).​[10]​ Her misgivings about the human rights project are rooted in a distrust of a suggestion about the ultimate source of rights – the universalistic appeal to a putative nature of man – that spans centuries. Arendt’s critique thus assumes the very connection that Moyn wishes to deny. Indeed, it is Arendt’s belief in such a connection that allows her to assert that ‘the Declaration of the Rights of Man at the end of the eighteenth century was a turning point in history’ (Arendt, 1958: 290, emphasis added). The reason that the eighteenth-century marks, for her, such a turning point is precisely because political declarations of rights then become rooted in universalistic appeals to nature and humanity, rather than custom.​[11]​ As she notes, ‘the Rights of Man…had been defined as “inalienable” because they were supposed to be independent of all governments’, even though they were, in practice, thwarted by the very national sovereignty that they, in theory, threatened (Arendt, 1958: 291).
Arendt’s discussion explicitly links human rights to the rights of man; nothing she writes in The Origins of Totalitarianism implies any meaningful conceptual distinction between the two. If anything, her analysis further supports rather than repudiates the continuity thesis about the origins of human rights, advanced by Hunt and accepted as a commonplace by others. Much therefore hinges on what Moyn sees as novel about the contemporary politics of human rights, what he thinks changes in the late twentieth century. As noted, the singular feature is, for him, the central focus on ‘the politics of suffering abroad’: that is, the explicit political internationalism that is said to have accompanied the explosion of interest in human rights in the 1970s. As discussed earlier, Ishay’s thesis about the ancient intellectual lineage of human rights is enabled by her construal of the object of study itself: for her, a commitment to human rights is equivalent to an endorsement of a seemingly supra-historical ethical universalism. Moyn’s thesis about the sudden emergence of human rights in the 1970s is likewise enabled by his construal of the object of study. Upon inspection, it becomes clear that for Moyn, unlike Ishay, the concept of human rights is equivalent to – and therefore evinced by – a specific set of political practices and institutions. We saw a hint of this already, with Moyn’s claim that the rights of man ‘proclaimed in the Enlightenment… were so profoundly different in their outcomes…as to constitute another conception altogether’ from the human rights of the late twentieth century (2010: 1-2, emphasis added). 
For Moyn, the political entailments of a particular idea – what he calls its ‘outcomes’ – are key to determining its meaning and to then pinpointing its historical origins.​[12]​ Thus, for him, the aforementioned statist location of rights observed by Arendt ‘was not some accident that tragically befell the rights of man: it was their very essence, for the vast bulk of their history’ (Moyn, 2010: 30, emphasis added). The ‘essence’ of a concept is here understood as its practical instantiation in the world. This view is further revealed in Moyn’s separation of the early-modern thought of writers like Grotius – in which universal natural rights are invoked as politically authoritative implications of natural law – from contemporary understandings of human rights.​[13]​ Moyn’s view is that ‘if the idea of natural rights first emerged in the old language of natural law, it was so different in its intentions and implications as to be a different concept’ (21, emphases added). 

Distinguishing Ideas from Actions/Practices
It is clear therefore that outcomes and implications, practices and institutions, reveal, for Moyn, the nature of political concepts. This understanding of the nature of concepts, such that we can gauge their meaning through attention to their practical instantiation – their policy intentions and implications – is crucial in what it reveals about the kind of historical claim being issued.​[14]​ It shows that Moyn’s main interest is in tracing the history of a specific, practical, political project: when the distinction he makes between historical understandings is probed, it becomes clear that his focus must be the specifically international practices and institutions that are justified in the name of human rights. And once this specific focus on practices and institutions – on human rights as a specific political movement – is unearthed, we can then show how Moyn’s historical thesis errs. Doing so then opens a space for a different approach to historical analysis to be defended, which, in turn, then enables the development of alternative narratives about the history of human rights. 
To show how Moyn’s analysis overreaches, we must individuate the history of ideas: we must distinguish it from other kinds of history. In doing so, we can identify the object of study appropriate to it. One initial distinction to make is between the history of ideas and the history of the language used to convey ideas. The clarification of this distinction is important, since language is invoked by Moyn as important evidence for the historical existence of human rights – though he does not offer any justification for doing so. He observes how the term ‘human rights’ has been deployed in mainstream political argument: although first ‘consecrated’ in the 1940s, leading up to the UDHR (2010: 11), it was then ‘soon dropped’ (2010: 2), until the 1970s, when ‘the phrase “human rights” entered common parlance in the English language’ (2010: 8). This focus on the prevalence of human rights as a discursive trope allows him to confidently disregard its occasional presence in eighteenth-century texts – such as Paine’s Rights of Man – as merely ‘accidental’ (2010: 25), while also viewing its absence from mid-twentieth-century texts – such as John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice (2010: 214) – as the type of evidence that buttresses his argument.
Even though the expression of ideas usually involves language, it is nevertheless certainly the case that the history of language is separable from the history of ideas. Charting the presence of a linguistic term over time is not the same as identifying the historical existence of an idea held by individuals. It is not the same for the banal reason that the meanings of words change over time. There are various examples of this phenomenon in the history of political thought, and the history of individual rights provides an instructive one. A scholarly consensus observes a medieval shift in understanding of the word ius (the Latin term for ‘right’) from being synonymous with justice (a state of affairs corresponding to ‘objective right’) to meaning an entitlement held by an individual against others (a ‘subjective right’). There is disagreement on the question of whether ius came to signify a subjective right very suddenly in the fourteenth century through the writing of William of Ockham, or more gradually in the two centuries preceding it (Tierney, 1997: 13-77). But although scholars diverge on that issue, they are nonetheless agreed that the meaning of the term ius did, in fact, undergo such a change, from an objective state of affairs to a subjective entitlement. Such a change in meaning makes it plain that there must be an important difference between a history of the use of the word ius and a history of the idea of a subjective right. The methodological upshot of this is that the history of the uses of language must be robustly distinguished from the history of ideas, as the two have distinct objects of study: though occasionally coincident (since at a certain point of history ius did mean subjective right), they are necessarily separate entities (since ius did not always mean subjective right). This distinction then implies that it is an open question, one to be settled through historical evidence and argument, whether eighteenth-century uses of the phrase ‘human rights’ are equivalent to twentieth-century uses or not. By extension, it also means that we cannot blithely assume a difference between eighteenth- and twentieth-century ideas of rights based on differences in the terminology used to express those ideas. The presence (or absence) of the term ‘human rights’ is not (necessarily) relevant to a history of the idea of human rights.      
An even more important distinction for the present context is between the history of ideas and the history of practices. Although Moyn often appears to include both ideas and practices in his references to human rights, his historical argument only makes sense in terms of the latter rather than the former and, once this is admitted, its force diminishes significantly, in that it cannot sustain the dramatic conclusion he offers. The ideas/practices distinction can be explained through further examination of the object of study in question. As noted, Moyn’s understanding of human rights is evidently a practice-focused approach, as it ascribes meaning to what he calls ‘outcomes’: the enactment of particular laws, the development of specific policy goals, and the existence of certain political practices and institutions. Such a practice-focused approach represents an important departure from any interest in human rights as an idea. A focus on the practical implications of ideas is not the same as a focus on ideas themselves.
What would be the alternative object of study be for the historian of ideas? What, indeed, are ideas, and how can they be plausibly distinguished from practices? The most philosophically sophisticated explanation of the nature of the history of ideas has been developed by Mark Bevir, who spells out quite doggedly the ‘genuine distinction’ between it and ‘history in general’ (1999: 139).​[15]​ As he points out, ideas are most appropriately defined as the beliefs or viewpoints expressed by individuals through communicative utterances (1999: 32-77, 127-73). The history of ideas is, on this understanding, therefore concerned fundamentally with the ascription of beliefs – of various sorts, and at different levels of abstraction – to individuals. Bevir contrasts this interest in the belief-centred history of ideas with an alternative interest in the history of actions. As he acknowledges, the stability of this distinction between histories of ideas and histories of actions may seem at first to be counter-intuitive, for two reasons: (1) ‘because actions typically embody ideas’ and (2) ‘because to express an idea is to perform an action’ (Bevir, 1999: 140). The first of these reasons seems to present the most significant challenge to the ideas/actions distinction. That individual actions typically embody ideas is something we corroborate through our everyday experience. For R.G. Collingwood – inspired ultimately by Hegel – because ‘every action is the expression of thought’ (1999: 49), it follows that ‘all history is the history of thought’ (1999: 67). Since actions reveal and reflect thought, Collingwood’s conclusion is that any purported distinction between ‘ordinary history and the “history of thought”’ is absurd, since it imagines that ‘thinking is the exclusive privilege (or curse) of special persons called thinkers’ (1999: 69).
It is, however, possible both to endorse Collingwood’s claim about the entwined nature of thought and action – and thus approve his imperious conclusion about the history of thought – and yet nevertheless also insist upon the theoretical soundness of a crucial, practical distinction between histories of ideas and histories of actions. To explain such a rapprochement, we must turn to the second reason Bevir gives for the counter-intuitive response to the ideas/actions distinction. This second reason is that the expression of an idea itself constitutes an action. We can focus on the truth of this observation to delineate different possible objects of study for different historians, and show how the recognition of Moyn’s approach as ultimately practice-based effectively deflates his radical novelty thesis.
Awareness of the fact that the expression of an idea is itself an action has become commonplace in the history of political thought in recent years, especially since Quentin Skinner’s pioneering application of J.L. Austin’s theory of speech-acts to the study of political texts (e.g. Skinner, 2002). Skinner’s influential work on Hobbes provides an illustrative example. As his analysis demonstrates, Hobbes’ Leviathan – as well as being an abstract philosophical treatise on the nature of political obligation – can be profitably interpreted as a political action, specifically as an attempt to rhetorically manipulate the language of liberty to the disadvantage of his ideological opponents (see e.g. Skinner, 2008). When delineating the meaning of concepts, Hobbes offers a famously austere, physicalist definition of liberty as ‘the absence of opposition’ (Hobbes, 1991: 145). This definition stands in contrast to that preferred by Hobbes’ contemporary republican adversaries, who instead conceived of liberty in more politically demanding terms, as freedom from the domination of an arbitrary authority (Skinner, 2008). The focus on rhetoric encouraged by Skinner reveals an ideological dimension of Hobbes’ philosophical writing: it shows the composition of Leviathan as a political intervention that sought to manipulate language – and deflate the meaning of liberty – for political ends.
Skinner’s reading of Hobbes exposes one specific aspect of the text: its performative nature, its status as an action. As Bevir’s analysis demonstrates, however, this action-oriented aspect of the text is, from the viewpoint of the historian of ideas, actually extraneous to its hermeneutic, communicative meaning. As he points out, although ‘all historians study the same things’, different historians are interested in different ‘components’ of those things, and ‘historians of ideas ask questions exclusively about the beliefs these things express’, while other historians – of actions – focus on other issues, including the practical dimensions of Hobbes’s writing (Bevir, 1999: 141, emphasis added). Thus, although historical texts such as Leviathan can be appreciated as exemplifying the simultaneity of ideas and action, we can also prise apart these dual aspects of the same object, in order to make differently-focused interpretive claims, which then define the nature of the enquiry in question. Such claims can focus either on the text as the embodiment of action or as a conveyor of ideas.
So, when an author expresses her ideas in a specific text, those ideas have a kind of interpretive autonomy insofar as their meaning is never reducible to the action in question. The implication of this autonomy is that the ideas expressed in a text can be interpreted without reference to the practical outcomes of those ideas, and its status as action can therefore be legitimately ignored. This autonomy of the meaning of ideas, and their corresponding interpretive primacy, can be illustrated once again through consideration of Hobbes. Regardless of the action-oriented part of Hobbes’ Leviathan, it is nevertheless the case that the beliefs he expresses in that work have a meaning that stands apart from that action. We know this for the obvious reason that the meaning of Hobbes’s utterances – the meaning of the viewpoint communicated through his writing – can be understood without understanding the nature of his action. We can understand what Hobbes means when he expresses his view that liberty means ‘the absence of opposition’ whether we are aware of the intended outcome of his speech-act or not. The abstract meaning of his utterance (the statement of his belief) is his definition of liberty as the absence of physical opposition. It is then this meaning – that of the beliefs expressed by Hobbes in Leviathan​ – that is within the purview of the historian of ideas. It is not the effects its author was hoping to engender through its publication that are of relevance. They are irrelevant to the historian of ideas because they have no more than a contingent relationship to the expressed beliefs in question.​[16]​ The historian of ideas and the historian of actions are – though often interested in the same historical evidence – committed to fundamentally different tasks. We can therefore happily accept Collingwood’s thesis that all history is the history of thought, and yet still maintain the vitality of the ideas/actions distinction as far as the focus of historical enquiry is concerned.

Approaching the Idea of Human Rights	
It is worth emphasising that the purpose of distinguishing those different considerations of Hobbes’ Leviathan is not to suggest any exact analogy between the approaches of Skinner and Moyn. It is rather to illustrate the solidity of the distinction between the study of ideas themselves (as expressions of abstract beliefs) and the study of the practical outcomes or instantiations of those ideas. The two are fundamentally different enterprises. And it is quite clear from his discussion of Arendt that it is actions and practices that Moyn is interested in.​[17]​ His contention is that human rights were invented in the late twentieth century. But, upon closer inspection, what he must mean is that human rights in action – human rights as a practical project of political internationalism – should be thought an invention of the late twentieth century. His account is a history of political actions/practices: it is an analysis of the global movement to enshrine human rights in international law, and of the increasing tendency for states and non-state actors to campaign for their priority and protection. So, even if Moyn is correct in his (controversial) claim that the emergence of internationalised political and legal institutions and practices – which are devoted specifically to the protection of human rights across the world – marks a radically novel development in global history, it certainly does not imply any parallel novelty for the idea of human rights.
Indeed, the discontinuity that Moyn claims between eighteenth- and twentieth-century conceptions of human rights refers only to practices, and not to ideas: the fact that the international (legal and political) institutions that he highlights were in existence at one time, but not the other, has no necessary bearing on the ideas held at either time. The normative implications, or policy outcomes, of political ideas, especially abstract ones, are notoriously open to contestation. And so, to identify different implications or outcomes at different historical times, and then to infer – as Moyn does – the existence of different fundamental ideas underpinning those implications or outcomes, is not a legitimate move. Moyn’s distinction between the rights of man and human rights depends upon collapsing that between ideas and actions: it depends upon treating ‘the politics of citizenship at home’ and ‘the politics of suffering abroad’ as different ideas when they are, in fact, not only actions rather than ideas, but are also, conceivably, actions that stem from interpretations of the same idea. It is true, as noted already, that political actions and practices embody, or reflect, ideas, but the study of such actions and practices is nonetheless not equivalent to the study of ideas. Furthermore, because we know that practices reflect ideas, we also know that ideas have not only autonomy, but also a logical interpretive primacy: the understanding of ideas must precede the understanding of actions. To understand an action or practice, we must first understand the ideas behind it. Indeed, if we do otherwise – for example, if we treat practices as a form of behaviour that is given, or else an implied consequence of institutional rules – we naturalize the action and reify the practice. Ideas must have logical interpretive primacy over actions and practices, because the alternative would deny the fact that the actions and practices in question are constructed, maintained, and challenged through the agency and intentionality of individual actors.
What, then, of the history of the idea of human rights? The discussion above implies that such a history would involve the ascription of relevant beliefs to individuals, rather than focus on actions/practices. Scholars who wish to study the history of the idea of human rights must therefore identify the beliefs that comprise the idea of human rights, in order to then gauge the plausibility of ascribing it to particular authors. It might be worried that the prospects for any agreement over the precise nature of the idea of human rights are somewhat bleak, since its meaning will be a matter of some contestation. There is considerable disagreement over the meaning of normative values – like equality, democracy, and so on – and there seems no reason to suppose human rights should be any different. The nature of such prospective disagreement can, however, be misleading since it is likely to pertain to the normative entailments of the idea in question, rather than to its abstract meaning. We know, for instance, that contemporary liberal theory is marked simultaneously by agreement over a commitment to human moral equality as an abstract idea and profound contestation about what that idea demands in normative political terms. The fundamental endorsement of equality is characteristic of liberal thought, even though its practical implications are keenly disputed. We can presumably expect similarly intractable disagreements about the content of human rights, while nevertheless presuming agreement about the form that the idea being disputed actually takes. We might go further and insist that such formal agreement must be presupposed by the disagreement about content: if this were not the case, it is hard to see what the disagreement in question would be about in the first place.
We can thus allow for disagreement about the normative implications of human rights while also seeking a definition of the fundamental idea that is the object of that disagreement. Scholars who are aware of the historically particular nature of concepts have offered appropriately austere descriptions of the idea of human rights. Jack Donnelly puts forward the following basic definition:
‘Human rights are, literally, the rights we have simply because we are human. They are equal rights….They are inalienable rights: one…cannot lose one’s human rights, no matter how horribly one behaves nor how barbarously one is treated. Human rights are also universal rights, held by every human being, everywhere’ (Donnelly, 2006: 601).
According to this characterisation, whatever a commitment to human rights may practically entail – and so what specific human rights may be thought to exist – commitment to it as an abstract idea involves endorsement of the following beliefs: (1) that human rights are entitlements held by human beings; (2) that they are justified with reference to the single fact that they are human beings; (3) that they are held equally by all human beings; (4) that they are held universally; (5) and that they are inalienable. 
	Whichever basic definition of the idea of human rights is stipulated, for it to be successful it needs not only to be philosophically abstract, but also historically specific to a sufficient degree, such that it avoids the pitfalls we identified earlier, where the conception descends to a vague universalism. Although it is abstract, we can see how Donnelly’s characterisation of the idea of human rights could allow for a historical understanding that is narrower than that offered by Ishay, and yet broader than that put forward by Moyn. Contra Ishay, this idea of human rights evidently cannot be found in ancient political thought. Contra Moyn, this idea of human rights undoubtedly precedes the 1970s: we find its core beliefs expressed in the UNDHR, the first article of which states unequivocally that ‘all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights’. 
	There appear to be echoes of this abstract expression of the idea of human rights in the revolutionary documents emphasised in Hunt’s eighteenth-century thesis. The first article of the French Declaration observes similarly that ‘men are born, and always continue, free, and equal in respect of their rights’, while the second paragraph of the American Declaration asserts that ‘all men are created equal’ and consequently are in possession of ‘certain unalienable Rights’. In Rights of Man, Paine writes that ‘men are all of one degree, and consequently that all men are born equal, and with equal natural right’ (Paine, 1969: 274). The understanding of the idea of human rights as a cluster of abstract normative beliefs might be very friendly to the view that it has ultimately eighteenth-century origins. Such a conclusion can of course be potentially resisted. Critics might charge that these revolutionary documents depart in some important way from the idea of human rights put forward by Donnelly. Women are notably absent from explicit mention in the French Declaration and from Paine’s text, and yet they are evidently part of the universality thought relevant to human rights. God is notably absent from contemporary philosophical justifications of the idea – which appeal solely to the criterion of humanity – and yet is cited in the American Declaration as the authority through which individuals are ‘endowed’ with the universal rights that they have. 
	Nevertheless, whatever force these specific objections have, and whether they do ultimately undermine the thought that human rights have eighteenth-century roots, they have no actual bearing on the methodological argument outlined above. They are merely empirical objections to – or claims about – one potential historical narrative based on a seemingly plausible characterisation of the idea of human rights. The universal acceptability of Donnelly’s specific characterisation as the definition of human rights is of no importance for my over-arching argument, and nor is the ultimate plausibility of Hunt’s continuity thesis. Donnelly’s characterisation is rather intended to illustrate the fact that any history of the idea of human rights needs to provide some account of the core cluster of conceptual and normative beliefs that comprise that idea, and not conflate this with the practices that signal instead an interest in histories of political action. For the purposes of this discussion, it is sufficient that Donnelly’s be thought a potentially plausible characterisation of the fundamental components – the discrete beliefs – that might comprise the idea of human rights. If it is not this characterisation that is to be utilised, then another – of a similar, belief-centred form – must be specified for potential ascription to historical actors.

Conclusion
The main objective of this article has been to criticize certain ways of approaching the history of human rights, in order to then defend an alternative framework for doing so. I considered two very different analyses of the history of human rights, explained why they appear mistaken, and showed how their errors can be traced to their methodological presuppositions, the way that the object of study is construed in each. I began with Ishay’s view of human rights as an apparently timeless – or at least supra-historical – concept, which she ascribes to the major monotheistic religions, as well as numerous ancient writers. I rejected her narrative on the basis that it trades on an understanding of human rights that is far too vague, one that amounts to an anaemic species of ethical universalism that may not even have been held consistently in the traditions she instances. I then moved on to interrogate, in far greater detail, Moyn’s alternative thesis, which claims the radical novelty of human rights, locating the conception in the late twentieth century. I suggested that Moyn’s thesis relies on a misappropriation of Arendt’s writing, since her Burkean critique actually undermines his claim there is a fundamental discontinuity between eighteenth- and twentieth-century conceptions of human rights. I argued that the only way in which Moyn’s analysis makes sense is as a history of the practice of human rights and that this significantly diminishes its force, insofar as it causes the radical novelty thesis at its heart to unravel. Drawing on arguments developed by Bevir, I suggested that we can separate histories of ideas from histories of action, with the former defined by their sole concern with the analysis of beliefs. 
As noted, when it comes to human rights, a belief-centred approach appears to lend support to narratives significantly narrower in scope than that offered by Ishay, and considerably broader than that offered by Moyn. Such an approach also has important further implications for how such historical narratives can inform contemporary theoretical discussions about human rights. Moyn pointedly criticises Hunt for treating human rights ‘as if they were a set of beliefs analogous to heliocentrism or relativity, needing only discovery and acceptance’ (2014: 8). As my analysis demonstrates, it is perfectly legitimate to treat the idea of human rights as a cluster of beliefs. Perhaps, however, there remains a question about the value of doing so. Part of Moyn’s worry about narratives that stress ideational continuity is that they implicitly depoliticize the concept of human rights, because its appearance on the political landscape is naturalised and its contingency denied: the thought – behind the worry about ‘discovery and acceptance’ – is that there is some implicit teleology at work through such an abstract approach. 
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^1	  Earlier versions of this paper were presented to the ‘Human Rights: Founding Myths and Historical Perspectives’ conference at the University of Lisbon School of Law, the Exeter Political Theory symposium, the Plymouth International Studies seminar, the Midwest Political Science Association conference in Chicago, and the Oxford Political Thought (APT) conference. I am grateful to those audiences for their thoughtful responses, to the anonymous referees and editors at Political Studies for constructive criticism, to Luís Pereira Coutinho, Robin Douglass, and Simon Townsend for very useful written comments on previous drafts, and especially to Sarah Drews Lucas for extensive discussion.
^2	  Similarly diffuse roots are claimed in (Lauren, 2003). For a much more sceptical discussion of alleged non-Western intellectual sources for the idea of human rights, see (Donnelly, 2003: 71-88).
^3	  ‘Notwithstanding the different moral priorities contained in each of these ethical stances, it is clear that all of the aforementioned traditions – although not always exposed directly to each other – share basic views of the common good, thereby reinforcing the Socratic argument for a universal goodness’ (Ishay, 2004: 60).
^4	  Moyn’s analysis also rejects another highly influential thesis about the origins of human rights, which sees it – through the UDHR – as a distinct product of the 1940s. See (Glendon, 1999). 
^5	  Hunt’s broader thesis is that the emergence of human rights is best explained with reference to the widened sphere of empathy during the eighteenth century, evidence of which she ascribes to the contemporary development of the novel (2007: 35-69). Moyn targets Hunt’s narrative directly in (2014: 1-18).
^6	  For Beitz, the continuity thesis advanced by Hunt is uncontroversial: ‘regarded as a thesis in the history of ideas, human rights are indeed the legacies of natural rights’ (2009: 50). For further discussion, see (Nickel 2007: 8-14).
^7	  Hunt compares the French Declaration with the UDHR and concludes that ‘although the modifications in language were meaningful, the echo between the two documents is unmistakable’ (Hunt, 2007: 17).
^8	  Arendt famously notes that ‘to be a slave was after all to have a distinctive character, a place in society – more than the abstract nakedness of being human and nothing but human’ (1958: 297).
^9	  See, for example, (Arendt, 1958: 293), where the two ideals are treated as conceptually equivalent.
^10	  Arendt’s invocation of Burke’s anti-universalism does not necessarily undermine a cosmopolitan interpretation of her thought, as (Benhabib, 2004) has shown.
^11	  The French Declaration ‘meant nothing more nor less than that from then on Man, and not God’s command or the customs of history, should be the source of Law’ (Arendt, 1958: 290).
^12	  What Moyn means by ‘outcomes’ is not spelled out very precisely, and it seems to be conflated with his commitment to thinking about human rights as the ‘set of institutional practices’ that defines the ‘international human rights movement’ (Moyn, 2014: 13).
^13	  Moyn echoes an established, but highly controversial, view – associated most famously with Jean-Jacques Rousseau – that Grotius should be read as a Hobbesian theorist, for whom the dictates of natural law concern reason rather than morality (Moyn, 2010: 22).
^14	  This practice-based construal is consistent throughout Moyn’s narrative: for him, ‘neither the cosmopolitanism of the Stoics nor the original concept of humanity were remotely similar in their implications to current versions’ (2010: 15, emphasis added); the revolutionary idea of the rights of man was ‘part of a political project strikingly distinct from contemporary human rights’ (2010: 20, emphasis added). 
^15	  See (Bevir, 1999: 139-142) for fuller discussion.
^16	  See Bevir (1999: 129-142) for a philosophical vindication of this. 
^17	  I am using actions and practices interchangeably because I take the latter simply to be regular (and often regulated) instances of the former.
